In this paper we look for the second best optimal policy in the Uzawa-Lucas model with externality in human capital and labor-leisure choice. We study a setup where lump sum taxes are not available. Given that the authorities should aim at increasing time spent studying, we explore which instruments can help government conduct the economy to the highest possible welfare. Our results suggest that both taxes on capital and labor income should be used as instruments to raise revenues for …nancing the education subsidy. Welfare losses due to di¤erent tax policies are illustrated by means of numerical simulations.
Introduction
In this paper we look for the second best optimal policy in the Uzawa-Lucas model with externality in human capital, with labor-leisure choice. We study the setup where lump sum taxes are not available and explore which combination of …scal instruments can help government to conduct the economy to the highest possible welfare.
In the setup that builds on Uzawa (1965) and Lucas (1988) , Gomez (2003) shows that lump sum taxation can be avoided and that the optimal solution can be achieved by taxing labor income and subsidizing investment into human capital. Gorostiaga et al. (2013) include leisure-labor decisions into the model of Gomez (2003) . They show that obtaining revenues through lump sum taxes and using them to subsidize forgone earnings while studying leads to optimal solution. However, in the absence of lump sum taxes, revenues for the subsidy will have to be raised by some other means. Seminal contributions of Judd (1985) or Chamley (1986) recommend not to tax capital in the long run. However, it may not be valid in all scenarios, see Conesa et al. (2009) . We explore here what should be the optimal combination of labor and capital income taxes to reach the second best solution.
Equilibrium dynamics in the Uzawa-Lucas model with leisure is very rich. It has been studied for example by Benhabib and Perli (1994) and Ladrón-de-Guevara et al. (1997 and 1999) . Due to the aggregate increasing returns in the production technology and leisure in the utility function, there might exist a unique trajectory or arise a continuum of transitions towards a unique or multiple balanced growth paths. Gorostiaga et al. (2013) analyze the dynamics in the present model for the centralized economy.
In the present work we will pay attention to the balance growth path analysis and the transitional dynamics for a particular parametrization. We develop analytical results for Cobb-Douglass production function and logarithmic utility. In general, there might exist a parameter space where multiple balanced growth paths occur. Nevertheless, a part of our analysis is restricted to the case of total depreciation of both capitals, a model which exhibits unique equilibrium.
We evaluate welfare under the social planner solution and under di¤erent combinations of capital and labor income tax rates. Subsidy rate then depends on the obtained revenues, as the government always keeps its budget balanced. We compute the welfare loss of alternative policies with respect to the social planner solution measured in percentage of the preferred mix of consumption and leisure goods.
Our results suggest that it is optimal to use both available …scal instruments: capital income taxation and labor income taxation. Positive tax on capital income distorts capital accumulation and may harm future consumption. However, welfare loss due to lower consumption can be compensated by higher leisure, given that in the second best environment time devoted to leisure is higher than the one in the centralized solution. 1 Our sensitivity analysis shows how the second 1 In the social planner solution, working time is lower than in the decentralized case with no intervention and best optimal policy tax ratio, labor income tax rate/capital income tax rate, varies over di¤erent sets of parameters. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The model economy, competitive and social planner equilibria are outlined in section 2. Analytical results are developed in section 3. Second best policy and welfare is discussed in section 4. Final conclusions are stated in section 5.
The Model Economy
We consider a model economy that extends Uzawa (1965) and Lucas (1988) to include leisurelabor decisions. There are two production sectors: the …nal goods sector and the education sector that produces new human capital. The economy is populated by identical and in…nitely lived agents. Total population is assumed to be constant and normalized to one. Households have initial endowments of physical and human capital, k 0 and h 0 ; respectively. Agents also have an endowment of one unit of time at each period t that they allocate to the production of the …nal good, u t , leisure activities, l t , or human capital accumulation, 1 u t l t .
Final Goods Sector
The …nal goods sector produces a commodity that can be consumed or accumulated as physical capital. The technology in this sector combines physical capital, k t , and e¢ ciency units of labor, u t h t , and is described through the Cobb-Douglas production function
where A is the technology parameter, 0 < < 1 is the share of physical capital in output, h at is the average human capital stock and the term h at captures the external e¤ect of average human capital in the production of goods. Note that the parameter measures the degree of the externality and also the degree of increasing returns to scale at the social level.
Firms maximize pro…ts taking prices and the average stock of human capital as given. Inputs' demands are such that r t = Ak
and
where r t is the return on capital and w t is the wage per e¢ ciency unit of labor.
the studying time is higher.
Education Sector
The schooling sector produces human capital services. Human capital accumulation depends on the time spent studying 1 u t l t and on the level of human capital h t according to
where is a measure of productivity in the education sector and h is the depreciation rate of human capital.
Households
Households derive utility from consumption, c t , and leisure, l t . Lifetime welfare is characterized by the utility function
where is the discount factor and b is the preference parameter on leisure. 2 Households pay proportional labor income taxes at rate wt and capital income taxes at rate rt . The government subsidizes the investment in human capital funding a fraction s t of wage income that is foregone while studying. The budget constraint that agents face at t can be written as
where k is the rate of depreciation of physical capital. The problem of the representative agent is to maximize the lifetime utility (5), subject to the budget constraint (6) , and the condition for the accumulation of human capital (4) and taking as given prices, policies and initial values for physical and human capital. Let t and " t be the non-negative Lagrange multipliers associated with the budget constraint (6) and the condition for the accumulation of human capital (4), respectively. The …rst order necessary conditions on consumption, labor, leisure, physical and human capitals, respectively, are
t (1
and transversality conditions are
The Lagrange multipliers associated with the budget constraint and the constraint on human capital accumulation, t and " t ; can be interpreted as the marginal utility of wealth and the shadow price of human capital, respectively. The …rst order condition on consumption (7) indicates the marginal utility of wealth. The …rst order conditions on working and leisure time, (8) and (9), determine the optimal allocation of time among the three activities, working, studying and leisure. The …rst order conditions on physical capital (10) and human capital (11) embody the costs and pro…ts associated with investing one marginal unit of wealth in either capital.
Plugging (7) and (8) into (9) and (10), we can easily get the usual intertemporal and intratemporal …rst order conditions
Note that the capital income tax distorts intertemporal consumption decisions and the labor income tax distorts consumption-leisure decisions.
Government
Fiscal policy targets human capital accumulation. The government taxes capital and labor incomes and subsidizes the investment into human capital. Wages lost while studying are subsidized by a ‡at rate. The government's budget constraint is solve the household's problem.
(ii) Given prices r and the average human capital h
solve the …rm's problem.
(iii) The average human capital h CE at is equal to h CE t at each period t.
(iv) The government budget is balanced in every period.
(v) All markets clear.
Therefore, when we consider a decentralized economy, equilibrium allocations, prices and policies have to satisfy equation (4) and equations (6)- (13) from the household problem, equations (1)- (3) from the …rm's problem, the government budget constraint (16) and an additional expression h at = h t :
Social Planner Problem
In this section we present the centralized economy. We assume that a social planner who internalizes the externality of human capital allocates resources and time so as to maximize lifetime utility. There will be two constraints in the planner's problem: one characterizing the human capital production technology, equation (4), and the so called resource constraint,
The necessary conditions for the …rst best allocation fc t ; k t+1 ; l t ; u t ; h t+1 g are the transversality conditions, equations (12) and (13), and the following set of equations
where " SP t and SP t are the Lagrange multipliers associated with constraints (4) and (17), respectively.
Since the planner takes into account the impact of average human capital in the production technology, she will …nd it optimal to devote more time to schooling than in a competitive equilibrium with no public intervention.
As in the competitive equilibrium case, we can substitute …rst order conditions (18) and (19) into equations (20) and (21) to get the intertemporal and intratemporal …rst order conditions of the planner's problem
The two equations above show that in the …rst best allocation, there is no wedge neither between the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution in consumption and the gross return on capital nor between the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption and the marginal product of labor. Any policy designed to decentralize the …rst best should not lead to any wedge between marginal rates of substitution and marginal rates of transformation.
We can see that there exists no optimal policy when tax rates are to be positive to raise revenues for the subsidy. It only exists if the subsidy can be …nanced by lump sums taxes, an economy analyzed in detail in Gorostiaga et al. (2013) .
Analytical analysis
This section will serve us to get highlights of the results. We …rst develop long run results for the model. Then we constraint values of some parameters to obtain analytical results also in the transition. 4 We begin our long run analysis by transforming the model so it exhibits a steady state. For this purpose, both tax rates will have to be set constant.
Transformation of the variables
For the growth rate of the marginal utility of wealth to be constant, equation (21), output and capital must grow at the same rate, and it also means that the ratio,
must be constant as t ! 1: Therefore, the growth rates of both capitals are related in the following way
Goods market equilibrium (17) implies that consumption must grow as output and physical capital
where g denotes the long run growth rate of the economy. The …rst order condition on consumption (7) implies that
for all t;
and the one on working time (9) implies that
Using (28) and the …rst order condition on human capital (11) we can obtain that the shadow price of human capital decreases at the same rate as the human capital increases
We can de…ne the ratio of both capitals that has a steady state as 4 Later on we will proceed by solving the Ramsey problem. and the transformed consumption and output aŝ
Transformation of other variables to stationary forms and the transformed equations that must hold in equilibrium are stated in the Appendix.
Decentralized Economy: Balanced Growth Path Behavior
In the following, we place asterisk to mark variables that remain constant in the long run.
Proposition 1 On the balanced growth path, when the capital and labor income tax rates are constant, lim t!1 rt = r and lim t!1 wt = w ; human capital grows at the rate
where l is the leisure time
the working time is
and the long run growth rate of consumption, physical capital and output is
Ratio of next period physical capital to output becomes
consumption to output is c = lim
; the relationship between physical and human capital de…ned as x t takes the value
and the subsidy rate is
Proof. See Appendix.
Thus we obtain the long run policy functions. Capital evolves as
consumption as
and human capital according to (4) with leisure and working times given by (32) and (33), and the long run growth rate given by (35).
Social Planner Solution: Balanced Growth Path Behavior
Proposition 2 On the balanced growth path, human capital grows at the rate
where l and u are the working and leisure times
consumption, real balances, physical capital and output grow at the rate
; the ratio that contains the relationship between physical and human capitals x t takes the value
Proof. We need to follow analogous steps as in the proof of the Proposition 1 setting all tax and subsidy rates to zero.
Transitional dynamics
Now let us assume that both capitals totally depreciate, k = h = 1: In that case the fraction of time allocated to each of the three activities -leisure, working and studying-remains constant over time. The previous long run results will hold also for the transition.
For the decentralized solution we keep the tax rates constant in all periods, rt = r ; wt = w :
Proposition 3 When the capital and labor income tax rates are kept constant, rt = r ; wt = w for all t; and k = h = 1; time allocation between leisure, working and studying is
Policy functions for consumption and both capitals accumulation are
and the subsidy rate is constant
Proof. Setting k = h = 1 and rt = r ; wt = w we can verify that the policy functions (44)-(46) and time allocations to leisure, working and studying (41)-(43) are compatible with equilibrium equations (1)- (4), (6), (7)-(11). Tax rate is obtained from the government budget constraint, (16).
For the centralized solution, we get the following results.
Proposition 4
When k = h = 1; time allocation between leisure, working and studying does not change over time
(50)
(51)
Proof. As before we verify that the solutions are compatible with equilibrium equations.
Welfare maximizing policy
We look for the second best optimal policy. In this case it means looking for the combination of capital and income tax rates that lead to minimum welfare loss with respect to the optimal, social planner solution. The measure of welfare di¤erences used is analogous to the one generally employed in the literature, as de…ned for example in Lucas (2003)
where q contains variables that agents derive utility from. In our case it is a mixture of consumption and leisure given by the utility function. Number ; in units of a percentage of the preferred mix of goods, gives us welfare gain or loss of following a policy A with respect to a reference case REF:
Given that our reference policy is the social planner solution, REF SP; and using our utility speci…cation we look for that satis…es the equality
Second Best Policy for Total Depreciation of Both Capitals

Numerical Procedure
Note that working and leisure times are functions of the subsidy rate, u = u(s) and l = l(s); equations (41) and (42): Therefore, to …nd the time allocation between the three activities we have to proceed by a numerical solution. For a given combination of taxes, ( r ; w ) ; we look for the subsidy rate, s; that ful…ls
Parametrization
To look for the second best policy we have to assign values to the parameters of our model. We work with the case where k = 1 and h = 1. We set the long run growth rate of the economy to g = 1:015: Externality measure is set to = 0:3; preference parameter on leisure to b = 1: Technology parameter is chosen to be A = 1: Discount factor is = 0:9, share of physical capital in output = 0:4 and the e¢ ciency of learning is the one that delivers the desired long run growth rate in the centralized solution, = 1:184: This parameter setting results in the following optimal time allocation: 6% of time is devoted to working, 7% to leisure and 87% to studying. We use as initial condition k 0 = 1 and h 0 = 1: 
Second best optimal policy
We calculate welfare loss for di¤erent combinations of capital and labor income tax rates with respect to the social planner solution, setting the number of periods to 9000. We obtain the welfare loss evaluating from the expression
where T = 9000: The general results are illustrated in Figure 1 (in the vertical axe we plot the inverse of welfare loss, 1 ). The 'top of the hill'represents the second best optimal policy (welfare loss is the lowest, thus the ratio 1 is the highest).
[ Figure 1 around here]
We can see that setting any value for the capital income tax rate, we will be able to identify the labor income tax rate that minimizes the welfare loss (points on the 'ridge'in Figure 1) . We de…ne such a labor income tax rate as We state the optimal second best policy pairs, corresponding subsidy rate, welfare loss and time allocation to working, leisure and studying for various parameters in Table 1 . The inability of the …scal instruments to correct totally the e¤ect of the externality implies that the allocation of time to the three activities is not optimal. In the second best, the working time is still lower than the optimal one compare in the table the values u and u SP ;
; and the leisure is higher then optimal compare l with l SP ;
: We can see that as the externality increases, its best correction requires higher education subsidy which results in both higher capital and labor income tax rates. Given that capital income tax harms the capital accumulation, see equation (45), and consequently next period output and consumption, (1) and (44), it is always optimal to tax more labor than capital income. 7 For our set of parameters the optimal tax ratio 2nd w 2nd r decreases from 7.8 (for = 0:1) to 5.7 (for = 0:5):
[ Table 1 around here]
In more capital intensive economies, when the participation of physical capital in output increases, it is harder to correct the e¤ect of externality, as the gap between competitive equilibrium and the optimal leisure times increases. The ratio 2nd w 2nd r decreases with . When agents become more patient, higher ; optimal subsidy is lower and the optimal tax ratio 2nd w 2nd r increases. Nevertheless, as the discount factor increases, the second best equilibrium is further from the optimal one, i.e. the welfare loss increases with .
In all cases exposed in the Table 1 (except of the case of b = 0; a model without laborleisure choice), capital income tax is positive. We attribute the optimality of a positive capital income tax to the fact that higher leisure under the second best (compared to the social planner case) contributes to higher utility and can compensate the losses su¤ered in consumption due to distortions in physical capital accumulation.
We can observe in Table 1 , that when the preference parameter on leisure b ! 0; agents do not care for leisure, and we get the result of Gomez (2003), optimal tax on capital is zero, and the optimal labor income tax rate is
Welfare loss under the laisser-faire is j r =0
w =0 = 0:1646; i.e. 16% of the stream of preferred consumption-leisure mix. 7 Second best relative optimal tax, labor/capital tax is higher than unity.
In this case, the time allocated to work and study coincides with the social planner solution. It is thus no longer possible to compensate for the welfare loss caused by the distortion in the capital accumulation, and consequent decline in consumption, by higher fraction of time devoted to leisure. Therefore, the zero capital income tax becomes welfare maximizing policy. The optimal tax ratio 2nd w 2nd r decreases with b: Changes in technology level, A; and social planner long run growth rate, g SP ; do not a¤ect the optimal policy results, they just scale the levels.
Conclusions
We show that in the Uzawa-Lucas model with externality in human capital and labor-leisure choice, in the absence of lump sum taxes, the second best optimal policy requires to tax both capital and labor incomes. Revenues to subsidize foregone earnings while studying can be raised imposing small positive tax rate on capital income, and a larger tax rate on labor income. This result di¤ers from the optimal …rst best policy in the presence of lumps sum taxes, when no tax on neither capital nor labor should be used. The unavailability of lump sum taxation thus requires a tax schedule to be related to the structure of the economy. Our results are shown on a particular case of an economy with total depreciation of physical and human capital. More general results are to be developed in the future.
The equations that must hold in equilibrium, after the transformation, are the following: production function (1), accumulation of human capital (4), relationship between the growth rate of human capital and the one of the economy (25) and (28), goods market equilibrium (17), …rst order condition on consumption (7), …rst order condition on labor and leisure time, (10) and (11), growth rate of marginal utility of consumption (8) and growth rate of shadow price of human capital obtained by plugging (8) into (11)
where H h = ( 1 for the decentralized solution, and 1 + for the centralized solution. :
In the case of centralized solution all tax rates should be set to zero for all t, i.e. rt = 0; wt = 0 and s t = 0:
Transformed equilibrium equations: steady state Denoting the long run values with an asterisk, we can write the system (54)-(62) in the steady state asŷ
In the case of centralized solution all tax rates should be set to zero, i.e. r = 0; w = 0 and s = 0: 
That means that the constant in the policy function for capital is
; and the one in the policy function for consumption
The …rst order condition on consumption (58) together with (72) imply that 
Let us look for the balanced growth path working and labor times, lim t!1 u t = u ; lim t!1 l t = l : Joining (68) and (69) we get one relationship between u and l
Using (64) and (71) 
